Geopolitics

From Exclusiveness to Inclusiveness: The Changing Politico-Territorial Situation of Spain and its Reflection on the National Offerings to the Apostle Saint James from the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

Cathelijne de Busser [a]

[a] Department of Geography, Planning and International Development
Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

From Exclusiveness to Inclusiveness: The Changing Politico-Territorial Situation of Spain and its Reflection on the National Offerings to the Apostle Saint James from the Second Half of the Twentieth Century

CATHELIJNE DE BUSSER

Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

In 1643, the Spanish king Felipe IV instituted an annual national offering to Saint James – the patron saint of Spain – that has been a yearly recurring custom on Saint James' day (25 July) almost ever since. Apart from the material offering, each ceremony is accompanied by an invocation of the king or a delegate (or, between 1939 and 1975, by Franco), and by a response of the archbishop of Compostela. These invocations must be considered very valuable, as they serve as expressive vehicles of the national preoccupations and their interpretation in religious terms under different politico-territorial circumstances. This article describes a content analysis of the invocations that belong to the national offerings to Saint James from the second half of the twentieth century. This period is characterised by some radical changes: it encloses the symbiosis between the centralised state-policy and Catholicism (National-Catholicism) during the Franco-regime (1939–1975), the transitional period (1975–1978) and the non-confessional, decentralised state-system after 1978. Furthermore, the changing European territorial order of the last few decades (whose main features are deterritorialization *and* reterritorialization*) has invoked the rise of supranational and subnational social spaces. The texts of the invocations offer the opportunity to gain insight into the adaptability of a religeopolitical phenomenon and*

Address correspondence to Cathelijne de Busser, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Prinsengracht 130, 1018 VZ Amsterdam, The Netherlands. E-mail: c.debusser@uva.nl

the strength of religion as a binding force for communities under the new politico-territorial circumstances.

RELIGION VERSUS TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES

Over the past few decades, the long lasting relatively fixed form of politico-territorial organisation within Europe has been challenged by the rise of transnational, supranational and subnational social spaces. Following Sack's definition of territoriality as the attempt by a group to affect, influence or control people by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area,[1] we have to conclude that nation-states are not the only sovereign territorial actors any longer. Whereas globalisation and the diminishing significance of spatial constraints are held responsible for a process of *deterritorialization*, the rise of supranational (e.g., the European Union and Euro regions) and subnational institutionalised territories has led to a development of *reterritorialization*. Both processes have been responsible for the replacement of some of the former tasks of nation-states to new forms of territorial and non-territorial social spaces. The strength of nation-states should nevertheless not be underestimated. Despite the growing significance of subnational, supranational and transnational social spaces, nation-states still dominate European politics and form a relatively fixed form of territorial organisation.[2] In addition, national identities still provide the main source of collective strength, although increasingly *nested* with identities of other territorial scales, such as the European identity.[3]

The concept of territorial identity consists of two dimensions that are closely related: the first, *territorial identification*, refers to the territory that people identify with; the second, *identity of a territory*, on the other hand, consists of the discourses and policies that are used to distinguish a certain territory from other territories by pointing at a specific identity.[4] It is the second dimension that is dealt with in this article: the narratives, symbols and practices that are connected with a community living in a territory. These cultural representations may both reflect and produce bonds between people living in the same territory. They can be studied from two perspectives: whereas the *popular* perspective looks at the manner in which the inhabitants of a territory perceive these representations, the *official* perspective rather focuses on the presentation of these narratives, symbols and practices by authorities. Both perspectives are closely related to issues of political legitimacy, as each institutionalised territory needs representations that legitimise the control over a territory.

The relation between religion and territorial legitimacy – in the sense of religious representations that legitimise the control over a territory – seems at first sight contradictory, as the triumph of the principle of territorial sovereignty in 1648 (the Treaty of Westphalia) is often considered the end of the

core position of the Roman Catholic Church. According to Anderson, the religious community as taken-for-granted frame of reference (the 'imagined community of Christendom') was now replaced by a political ideology of nationalism.[5] As a result, the former function of the Roman Catholic Church as the spiritual head of Christianity – represented by the Holy Roman Empire – reduced to the irrelevant sovereign territorial Papal States.[6] Yet the triumph of the principle of territorial sovereignty did not mean the total abandoning of religious principles for territorial identities. The principle of *cuius regio, eius religio* ('the religion of the ruler is the religion of the state'), for instance, meant that states kept for some time a religious identity and that they derived their legitimacy from God (the *droit divin*). Generally, it can be said that this close connection between religion and territorial identity came to an end from the final part of the eighteenth century. Influenced by the ideas of Rousseau on people's sovereignty, a change in the grounds for legitimising state power took place: 'from God to the people'. Kedourie considers nationalism for this reason a 'secular doctrine of self-determination'.[7] The main reaction of the Roman Catholic Church to this 'era of nationalism' was a return to transnational principles. The reaffirmation by the First Vatican Council (1870) of the papal supremacy of the entire Catholic Church illustrates this return to a global (or transnational) view of the Roman Catholic Church.[8] It is, however, incorrect to conclude from this that the Roman Catholic faith was not present at all as a binding factor for the national identities that came into being in this period. The Spanish identity, for instance, derived much of its collective strength from Roman Catholicism. In this country, an ideology of *National-Catholicism* came into being from the end of the nineteenth century and reached a climax during the reign of Franco (1939–1975). Although this merger between the Spanish national identity and Catholicism can to some extent be considered as extreme, it can still be said that nationalism as an ideological movement drew much of its passion, conviction and intensity from religion. Following Smith (1999), at least part of the passions aroused by modern nationalism can be explained by a belief in ethnic election.[9]

It is to be expected that the territorial developments of the past few decades have consequences for the issue of politico-territorial legitimation. During past phases of nationalism, religion often provided a powerful image of national exclusiveness and ethnic election. Particularly transitional and turbulent periods offer examples of the merger between politico-territorial legitimation and religion. The Jews provide the most famous example of expressions of religious election, but many other people, such as the Irish, the Serbs and the Croats can be mentioned as well. According to Smith, this merger between religion and politics can take two different forms: the *politicisation of religion* and the *messianisation of politics*.[10] When religion is *politicised*, it means that political significance is attributed to a religious phenomenons. The opposite situation takes places when politics are *messianised*: the nation and its leaders are

endowed with religious charisma. Both forms imply a *sense of exclusiveness*: the nation is considered a 'chosen people' with a 'sacred mission'.

Yet this sense of exclusiveness does not seem to fit with the current territorial situation within Europe: people experience senses of attachment to territories at different spatial scales at the same time (*nested identities*).[11] It can for this reason be argued that religion does not provide a suitable basis for contemporary European identities as long as it provides people with this sense of exclusiveness. Contemporary territorial identities require representations that do not repudiate other territorial identities. These 'nested territorial representations' may take two overlapping forms. In some cases, a territorial representation will be subsumed within another territorial identity. An example of this is the European heritage consisting of several national symbols, monuments and heroes. This means that the representation is subsumed within the identity of another territory without detaching it from its original territory. In other cases, features of another territorial level will be attributed to a territorial representation in order to strengthen its persuasiveness. This happens, for instance, when a region claims to represent the 'idea of Europe' with the aim to arouse regional consciousness.[12]

In the following part of this article, I will argue that religion in contemporary Europe may serve as a territorial representation of the last-mentioned type. I will do this by focusing on the invocations that are spoken each year on the occasion of the national offering to the apostle Saint James in Spain. This national offering used to provide the Spanish people with a sense of exclusiveness. By studying the manner in which this religious phenomenon has adjusted to the new territorial circumstances, insight will be gained into the adaptability and suitability of religion as a binding force for contemporary European identities. The main argument will be that a shift from *exclusiveness* to *inclusiveness* has taken place over the past few decades within Spain. This means that the national offering to the apostle no longer serves as an event to present the Spanish nation as a 'chosen people' with a 'sacred mission'. Instead, this religious tradition is now used as an opportunity to legitimise the 'plural Spanish nation' and its open attitude towards the European Union and the rest of the world. Since my main source consists of the invocations of the political authorities, I will not be able to draw any conclusions about the perceived politico-territorial meaning of Saint James on a *popular* level. Neither will I be able to give a complete overview of the politico-territorial meaning that is ascribed to Saint James on an *official* level. Instead, the article explicitly focuses on the manner in which the ceremony of the national offering legitimises the politico-territorial circumstances by means of Saint James. In order to understand the topics discussed in the invocations, it is first necessary to describe the history of the national offering to Saint James. I will discuss this history in view of the historical relation between Spanish identity and Catholicism. The article then continues with a content analysis of the invocations on the occasion of the

national offering from the second half of the twentieth century.[13] The findings of the content analysis will finally be combined with the above-discussed ideas on the relation between religion and territorial identities.

HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL OFFERING TO SAINT JAMES

In the early part of the ninth century, in the northwestern part of the Iberian Peninsula, a tomb was discovered that was believed to contain the mortal remains of the apostle James. The discovery of the tomb can best be interpreted as a logical result of the worship of Saint James that had already started in the seventh century. Initially this worship was particularly concentrated around the southern city Mérida (Extremadura). Yet after the Islamic conquest of Mérida in 712–713, many Christian adherents flew towards the north, which resulted in the northern relocation of the cult of Saint James. The cult is based on the life of Saint James – one of the twelve apostles of Jesus – who is believed to have spent part of his life on the Iberian Peninsula preaching Christianity. After his return to Jerusalem he was imprisoned and decapitated by order of King Herod Agrippa (41–44 AD). The legend states that his disciples took his body and carried it by sea to the Iberian Peninsula, where they buried it a few miles inland of the Galician coast. The discovery of his tomb eighth centuries later did not initially have a strong impact, but at the end of the ninth century the cult started to disseminate and pilgrims arrived to visit the tomb of the apostle. This resulted in the construction of an impressive church dedicated to the apostle and the coming into being of the city Santiago de Compostela (see Map 1). The pilgrimage flow towards the tomb of Saint James gradually developed into a mass event with pilgrims coming from all over the European continent to visit the tomb. The period between 1100 and 1300 in particular is considered the heyday of the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela when the city was in no way inferior to Rome and Jerusalem.[14]

Initially, the medieval cult of Saint James was a typical example of the 'transnational' or 'universal' nature of Roman Catholicism. Apart from some claims of local rulers,[15] the cult was not bound to a certain territory or community and the only legitimate 'owner' of the cult was the Roman Catholic Church. The universal pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela is in this respect most appealing to one's imagination. Yet very soon, the cult obtained an extra dimension when Saint James became known as *Santiago Matamoros* ('Saint James the Moorslayer') during the *Reconquista* (the reconquest over the Arabs of the Iberian Peninsula).[16] This new connotation can on the one hand be interpreted as the continuation of the transnational meaning of the cult – Saint James as defender of Christianity against the Islam – but it also meant a delimitation of the cult's territory – Saint James as the defender of the Iberian Peninsula.

FIGURE 1 Location of Santiago de Compostela in Spain.

From the final decades of the fifteenth century, the 'transnational' or universal pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela slowed down as a result of wars and the bubonic plague. In addition, the Reformation further diminished the pilgrimage flow, which by that time was already very weak. This nevertheless did not mean the end of the cult of Saint James. In fact, the marriage of the Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella (1474) meant a strengthening of the territorialisation of the cult that had already started during the reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula. The two kings recognised the 'debt' they owed to the apostle and expressed their gratitude by gifts to the Cathedral of Compostela and by introducing a tax, the *Voto de Santiago*. Since the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella is often considered the beginning of Spain as a political conglomeration, Saint James' fame as defender of Christianity was now almost entirely replaced by a reputation of being the patron saint of Catholic Spain. This territorial meaning of the cult of Saint James took a more official form in 1643 when the Spanish king Felipe IV instituted an annual national offering to the apostle on Saint James' Day (25 July):

> *His eminence – his majesty . . . obliged by the favors that he has received from the glorious apostle, just as his progenitors received for so many centuries, wishes that in his royal name . . . thousand golden arms will be offered yearly as recognition of the patronage by his majesty.*

> — First national offering (1643) by D. Martín de Redín, in name of king Felipe IV[17]

The institution of this yearly recurring national offer meant a public recogni-tion of the favours of the apostle to the monarchy of Spain. Three years after the first national offering on Saint James' Day (25 July 1643), another yearly national offering was instituted on 30 December 1646 to commemorate the transfer of the mortal remains of Saint James to Compostela.[18] Apart from some interruptions in the nineteenth century and during the Second Republic (1931–1939), these two national offerings to the apostle have been yearly recurring events from respectively 1643 and 1646 until present times.[19]

The continuation of the national offering to Saint James for such a long time can best be explained by the close relation between the Spanish iden-tity and Catholicism. Whereas the nineteenth century ideas of Church-State division spread over the rest of Europe, the 1851 Concordat officially con-firmed the historical position of the Spanish church and recognised Roman Catholicism as the national religion that was entitled protection of the Span-ish Crown.[20] A similar contradiction consists of the difference in attitude between the Roman Catholic Church within and outside Spain. Whereas the Roman Catholic Church outside Spain increasingly adopted a transnational attitude, the Spanish Church gradually embraced nationalism. In response to the anticlerical measures of the First Republic (1871–1873), the Spanish Church started to stress the old identification of Spain with Catholicism. From the Spanish Church's point of view, liberalism was not only a form of anticlericalism, but as well a manifestation of an anti-Spanish ideology. This ideology of *National-Catholicism* took a more definitive shape during the early twentieth century run-up towards the civil war (1936–1939) and was officially proclaimed by the Franco-regime (1939–1975).

After the death of Franco, the new Constitution of 1978 meant a radical change for the former centralised and Catholic Spain. The principle of *National-Catholicism* was abolished, which meant that Spain became not only a decentralised state, but also a non-confessional country. Yet Catholicism is still an intrinsic feature of Spain as a whole and remains by far the dominant religion. Furthermore, the Spanish state still treats the Roman Catholic Church in a privileged way, in spite of the Church-State religion.[21] The continuation of the national offering to the apostle can be interpreted as an example of this privileged position of the Roman Catholic Church in Spain. Despite the radical changes, this tradition is still held in high esteem in Spanish society.

THE CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE INVOCATIONS

Theoretically, many sources could be used to study the development of the politico-territorial significance of the cult of Saint James.[22] Yet when focused on the *official* level, the invocations offer a very appropriate – though not all embracing – source, as the ceremony of the national offering on 25 July is the main political event in the pilgrimage year. Although the material offering (a

financial gift to the Cathedral of Santiago de Compostela) was abolished in 1982, the ceremony has continued and still remains a very popular event. Even though Saint James' day (25 July) is not officially a holiday in Spain, Santiago de Compostela receives most of its visitors on this day. In addition, the ceremony is broadcasted by three television channels (TVE-1, Telecinco and Antena 3), one Galician television channel (TVG) and several radio transmitters.

The content analysis of the texts of the invocations can be subdivided into qualitative and quantitative parts. While the qualitative part of the analysis concentrates on all the invocations on Saint James' day from the second half of the twentieth century, the quantitative part focuses exclusively on the invocations during holy years. This quantitative part consists of the number of references to several territorial levels that were found in the texts of the invocations. All references to the relation of the cult of Saint James with subnational (Galician), national (Spanish), supranational (Europe) and transnational (world) affairs were counted. The restriction to the jubilee years means that this part includes only the texts of invocations given by Franco and King Juan Carlos I. The advantage of this restriction is that differences between years cannot be ascribed to differences between speakers (except, of course, for the difference between Franco and King Juan Carlos I). All eight jubilee years between 1950 and 2004 were taken into account. Three of them cover the Franco-era (1954, 1965 and 1971), one (1976) represents the transitional period between 1975 and 1978, and four years (1982, 1993, 1999 and 2004) were during the period in which Spain developed to a democratic, decentralised and non-confessional country. The qualitative part of the analysis is meant to compensate for the shortcomings of the quantitative analysis, as this part is not restricted to jubilee years. The results of this qualitative analysis are presented by means of quotations and by references to changing styles of the invocations over the years.

THE NATIONAL OFFERING IN FRANCOIST SPAIN

Francoist Spain (1939–1975) is a typical example of a merger between religion (Roman Catholicism) and national identity. Franco's policy of *National-Catholicism* suggested a *sense of exclusiveness* of the 'chosen' Spanish nation and its 'sacred mission' to evangelise the rest of the world. In correspondence with these ideas, the cult of Saint James was *nacional-catolizado* (national-catholicized)[23] and propagated and distributed in all parts of Spain as being part of the national-Catholic identity:

> *Wherever there is a Spanish captain, a noble undertaking and an invocation to our sacred Apostle, there is also the assistance of the Evangelist [Saint James] of our people.*

> —Invocation of Franco on 25 July 1948[24]

In accordance with the ideas of Smith (2000), the national offering during the Franco-regime combined two different forms of the alliance between national identity and religion: the *politicisation of religion* and the *messianisation of politics*.[25] The act itself meant the endowment of political significance to the worship of Saint James (*politicisation of religion*). Yet since the texts of the invocations and responses often stress the religious charisma of the nation and the political regime, it can also be interpreted in *messianic* terms, as illustrated by the following quote:

> *As prelate of the Holy Church I congratulate you, Excellency, for being chosen by God to reaffirm our Catholic unity.*

> —Response to the invocation of Franco by Fernando Quiroga Palacios, archbishop of Compostela, on 25 July 1954[26]

This *messianisation* of politics also comes to the fore from the recurring references to Saint James' presumed divine assistance during the civil war (1936–1939). Franco presented the battle of Brunete (1939) in particular as 'proof' of Saint James' divine assistance of his army during the civil war and could thereby legitimise his reign:

> *After long days of hard battles, [the battle of Brunete] was decided on a shining morning when the bells of our temples announced the festivity of the apostle Saint James, again uniting his intervention with our victory.*

> —Invocation of Franco on 25 July 1954[27]

Table 1 shows the results of the quantitative analysis for each holy year from 1950. As can be seen from this table, the national significance of Saint James was very high during the Franco-era, particularly when compared with the three most recent holy years. The only remarkable exception is the holy year of 1965. Whereas in the holy year 1954 ninety percent of all territorial meanings that were ascribed to Saint James in the invocation had referred to Spain,

TABLE 1 References to the significance of the cult of Saint James for Spain, Galicia, Europe and the world in the invocations of the holy years from 1954–2004

	Spain	Galicia	Europe	World
1954	90%	2%	4%	4%
1965	54%	0%	0%	46%
1971	88%	0%	8%	4%
1976	91%	3%	3%	3%
1982	94%	0%	0%	6%
1993	59%	17%	10%	14%
1999	49%	26%	11%	14%
2004	49%	18%	13%	21%

it was only 54 percent in the invocation of 1965. In addition, the percentage of references to the significance of Saint James for the world as a whole had been increasing from only 4 percent in 1954 to 46 percent in 1965. A similar pattern was found in the text of the responses of the archbishop of 1954 and 1965. This much more open attitude of Saint James towards the rest of the world can best be understood in light of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). The Declaration of Religious Freedom resulted in a new course of the Roman Catholic Church consisting of the protection of human rights on a global scale and the encouragement of democratization processes.[28] Yet in the following holy year of 1971, the percentage of references to the national meaning of Saint James was almost back on its old high level.

The national connotation that Franco ascribed to Saint James must, however, be put into perspective, as the Spanish society was very divided as a result of the civil war. The recurring references to Saint James' assistance of Franco's troops during the civil war show that the political legitimacy that Franco derived from Saint James did not apply to the Spanish nation as a whole. Instead, the national connotation that Franco ascribed to Saint James in his invocations referred to only half of the Spaniards: those Spaniards that had been in favour of the nationalist troops during the civil war. As illustrated by the following quote, Saint James had only been supporting the 'real Spaniards':

> It is less than 25 years ago, that real Spaniards . . . started the new Reconquest of our country [civil war] that, with your manifest protection and after immense sacrifices and heroism, would shine the light of a New awakening over Spain.

> —Invocation of Gregorio López Muñiz, in name of Franco, on 25 July 1963[29]

THE NATIONAL OFFERING IN THE INITIAL POST-FRANCO PERIOD

The new Constitution (1978) after the death of Franco meant a radical change in Spain. It not only involved the introduction of democracy, it also brought the official separation of Church and State and a decentralised state-system.[30] The separation of Church and State has from the beginning been rather ambiguous. Although the 1978 Constitution explicitly stated that there would not be an established Church, the close cooperation between the Catholic Church and the Spanish state has continued until present times. The continuation of the national offering to the apostle is a good example of the continuing significance of the Roman Catholic faith and culture in Spanish society.

The introduction of decentralisation involved the establishment of seventeen *comunidades autónomas* (autonomous communities) and two

African autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla). These autonomous communities were formed on the basis of regions and historical 'nationalities' (a term deliberately chosen to avoid the word 'nation'). The historical 'nationalities' consisted of those parts of Spain whose identity (history, language, culture and nature) differed from the rest of Spain. Although the 1978 Constitution does not explicitly state which parts of Spain are considered historical 'nationalities', three autonomous communities are generally considered to meet the criteria: Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia.[31] These three autonomous communities enjoy a higher degree of autonomy than the other autonomous communities. Ironically, one of the formerly most significant symbols of the Francoist policy of *National-Catholicism* – Santiago de Compostela – was from then on located in one of the regions that profited most of the decentralisation of Spain – Galicia. Yet in the initial post-constitutional years, the significance of Santiago de Compostela did not shift from Spain to Galicia. On the contrary, the national offerings of the first two jubilee years after the death of Franco (1976 and 1982) can best be described as a reconfirmation of the old principle of Saint James' patronage over Spain. As can be seen from Table 1, the invocations of King Juan Carlos I in 1976 and 1982 were of a particularly national nature: more than ninety percent of all territorial meanings that King Juan Carlos I ascribed to Saint James in 1976 and 1982 referred to Spain and the Spanish nation (respectively 91% and 94%). The high significance of the national dimension of Saint James during the invocations of 1976 and 1982 might therefore at first sight seem contradictory to the abandoning of the principle of *National-Catholicism* after the death of Franco. It also contradicts the new development in post-Franco Spanish society to criticize and repudiate all forms of nationalism, particularly by some left-wing political parties and intellectuals.[32] Yet as Núñez (2001) argues, Spanish nationalism did not disappear in post-Franco Spain. A very diverse form of nationalism continued to exist, despite the new decentralised territorial framework of the new Constitution in 1978 and the subsequent need to *delegitimise* Spanish nationalism. Within the right wing, Spanish nationalism varies between *National-Catholic nostalgia* on the one hand and *neo-nationalism* (preferring liberalism and civil thought) on the other. In the discourse of the left wing, the word *patriotism* is preferred above *nationalism*. Here *plurality patriotism* is expected to act as an element of solidarity in the new plural Spain. Spanish patriotism is considered to be the binding element that maintains the social cohesion of Spain.[33] Thus the high significance of the national meaning ascribed to Saint James in 1976 and 1982 corresponds with the need to *relegitimise* Spanish national identity, instead of solely *delegitimise* Spanish national identity.

The need to *relegitimise* Spanish nationalism in post-Francoist Spain by means of Saint James required nevertheless some adaptations of the apostle. Although the concept of *National-Catholicism* in Franco's Spain had suggested a high degree of cohesion, the country had in fact been much

divided as a result of the civil war. The need to *relegitimise* Spanish nation-alism therefore resulted in a new task for Saint James. Instead of the former exclusion of the 'bad' Spaniards, Saint James was now requested to support the process of reconciliation between the whole Spanish nation:

> *Saint James: (. . .). Let us forget the revenge and the hatred, and let us obtain a union of all Spaniards.*

> —Invocation of José María de la Guardia y Oya Carlos I on 25 July 1980[34]

Yet neither the right wing nor the left wing forms of Spanish nationalism fully reject the decentralisation of post-Franco Spain. Concepts like 'nation of nationalities', 'variety within diversity' and 'the plural Spanish nation' are used to legitimise the compatibility between Spanish nationalism and decentralisation. This explains the simultaneous support of Saint James for both the process of reconciliation and the decentralised state-system. Hence, Saint James' was not only assigned to bring unity to the Spanish nation, but to respect the 'variety within unity' at the same time:

> *[Saint James], let our governors succeed in maintaining the fraternity and union of all Spaniards, without being detrimental to the peculiari-ties of each region.*

> —Invocation of José María de la Guardia y Oya on 25 July 1979[35]

THE NATIONAL OFFERING IN POST-CONSTITUTIONAL SPAIN

In the invocations of King Juan Carlos I of the last three holy years (1993, 1999 and 2004), the percentage of references to the Spanish meaning of Saint James (respectively 59%, 49% and 49%) has been diminishing in favour of references to the world as a whole (14%, 14% and 21%), Europe (10%, 11% and 13%) and Galicia (17%, 26% and 18%). This noticeable shift from an exclusively Spanish meaning to a less restrictive territorial meaning (global, European and Galician) in the invocations in post-constitutional Spain comes also to the fore in the open-ing words of the invocations. Whereas the majority of the invocations of Franco and his delegates started with the opening words *Patron de España* ('patron saint of Spain'), it has now become common to refer to Saint James in general without any restriction to the Spanish territory or nation (*Señor Santiago*).

The recent Galician dimension is to some extent surprising, as there hardly ever existed any connection between the cult of Saint James and the Galician identity.[36] In spite of this lack of historical bond between Galicia and Saint James, several Galician features were added to the national offering from 1981, the year in which Galicia obtained the status of autonomous

community. It has, for instance, become common practice to present at least part of the invocations in *Gallego* – the Galician language – and the same accounts for the responses of the Archbishop. In addition, more than half of the national offerings after 1981 were presented by Galician delegates. It also has become common to request Saint James' protection of the Galician nation:

> *We, the Galician people, are strongly attached to our native country. We, the Galician people, are strongly attached to our maternal language. And You, Saint James, have the power to certify both facts.*
>
> — Invocation of Domingo García-Sabell, delegate of the Galician government, on 25 July 1985[37]

The supra-Spanish dimension that is added to the national offerings is less surprising than the Galician dimension, as it falls back on the transnational pilgrimage of the Middle Ages and its recent revival. An often mentioned concept in this context is the *espíritu compostelano* (spirit of Compostela), a term used as some sort of equivalent to transnationalism, as the following quote from the invocation of 2004 illustrates:

> *The national offering is a noble and dear tradition that the Spanish royal family has maintained for almost four centuries now. . . . All those years the spirit of Compostela has maintained its strength . . . a spirit that has served to overcome the old concepts of frontiers in order to establish a sentiment of a common destiny.*
>
> — Invocation of King Juan Carlos I on 25 July 2004[38]

Both recently added dimensions (Galician and supra-Spanish) are not only visible in the ceremony of the national offering, but also in other manifestations of the cult of Saint James. From the 1980s, the Way of Saint James – a collective name that stands for several European pilgrim routes that lead to Santiago de Compostela – has increasingly attracted Galician, European and international attention. *Xacobeo*, a Galician organisation that promotes the pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela, is the most striking example of Galicia's interest in the cult of Saint James. This organisation was founded in 1992 and is almost entirely funded by the Galician government. Its main objective is to promote the Galician identity by means of the cult of Saint James.[39] Several European efforts to encourage this pilgrimage have also taken place over the past few years, for instance in 1987 when the Council of Europe proclaimed the main trajectory of the Way of Saint James from the French-Spanish border as the first European Cultural Itinerary. UNESCO is a major player to promote the pilgrim ways on a world widelevel. This organisation added parts of the Spanish and French pilgrim ways to its list of World Heritage Sites in 1993 and 1999.[40] All these efforts have turned out to be

very fruitful: the Way of Saint James, almost abandoned by 1970, has over the past few decades become a famous trajectory for hikers (walkers, cyclists) from Europe and – though to a lesser extent – other parts of the world.

The correspondence between the shift in emphasis in the national offering on the one hand and the growing Galician, European and worldwide interest in the cult of Saint James on the other seems to indicate a simultaneous process of *deterritorrialisation* and *reterritoralisation* of Saint James. This means that Saint James is becoming a 'nested' representation for several identities.[41] Yet applying this idea solely to the ceremony of the national offering would ironically mean the undermining/weakening of the royal family and national feelings rather than reinforcing them. Hence, even though the development of the ceremony of the national offering displays many correspondences with other (Galician, Spanish and non-Spanish) claims and manifestations of the cult, the underlying explanations might be different. Rather than interpreting the changing territorial emphasis of the national offering as a gradual shift from a national meaning to subnational and supranational meanings, it can be explained by the post-constitutional manifestations of Spanish nationalism. Neither the right wing *nationalist* discourse (with the exception of the extreme right), nor the left wing *patriotic* discourse oppose Europe. Instead, as a consequence of the legitimacy problems of nationalism inherited from Franco, contemporary Spanish nationalism emphasises universal values and an open attitude toward Europe and the remaining world.[42] Furthermore, both discourses tend to stress the diverse and plural character of Spain as a 'nation of nationalities'. And so it happens that in his efforts to reconcile the historical national offering with the post-Constitutional Spanish nationalist ideology, the king does not hesitate to ascribe a medley of Galician, Spanish and supranational values to the saint. Naturally, the king does not do this with the aim to undermine or weaken nationalist discourse. Rather, the regional, national and supranational meanings that he ascribes to the saint correspond with the second form of 'nested representation': the attribution of features of another territorial level in order to strengthen its own persuasiveness. The mixture of national, regional and supranational features that are nowadays connected with the cult of Saint James must therefore be interpreted as a way to face the new subnational and supranational social spaces from a *national* viewpoint rather than as an indication for a diminishing national significance.

FROM EXCLUSIVENESS TO INCLUSIVENESS

There is perhaps no period in the history of Spain that encompasses a more extreme transition than the period from the second half of the twentieth century until the present. Whereas the Franco-era (1939–1975) consisted of a symbiosis between a centralised state-policy and Catholicism (*National-Catholicism*), contemporary Spain can be characterised as a non-confessional, decentralised

state-system. In addition, a process of *deterritorialisation* and *reterritorialisa-tion* has invoked the rise of subnational, supranational and transnational social spaces on a broader politico-territorial level. I have argued that in the past, reli-gion often provided a powerful source of collective strength, particularly in transitional or turbulent periods. The texts of the invocations given during the past few decades of intrinsic changes showed us that religion has still provided the Spanish political authorities with politico-territorial legitimation. This is not surprising for the Franco-era, when Catholicism was held in high esteem, but for the contemporary non-confessional Spanish state it is more striking. The contradiction between the non-confessional nature of the Spanish state and this national offering is simply justified as 'a gap that the Constitution does not fill':

> *This act . . . occupies exactly the space that the Constitution leaves open, by recognizing the Christian faith as the fundament of our identity.*

> —Invocation of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, president of the Galician govern-ment, on 25 July 1994[43]

By means of Saint James, the Spanish king legitimises the current decentra-lised Spanish state system and its relation to the European Union. This means that the more recent 'open attitude of Saint James' towards other ter-ritorial identities does not conflict with his continuing role as patron saint of Spain. Instead, it is a way to reconcile this old national tradition with the broader politico-territorial developments, though from a continuing national point of view. Although these invocations only provide insight into the meaning that is ascribed to Saint James on an official level, it does not alter the fact that a manner is found to reconcile the national dimension of this tradition with the current politico-territorial developments. Both Saint James's open attitude towards subnational identities and his support for supranational and transnational identities corresponds with the *relegitimation* of Spanish nationalism: the reconciliation of the Spanish nation and Spain's new course to become a worthy member of the European Union. This new attitude of Saint James towards identities at lower and higher territorial lev-els implies an important difference between the significance of religion for territorial identities in the past and at present times: whereas religion used to provide the Spanish nation with a *sense of exclusiveness*, it now rather invokes a *sense of inclusiveness*. In the case of the national offering, I mean by this the abandoning of the principles of 'chosenness' and 'divine elec-tion', and the ascription of more tolerant and worldly attributes to the saint.

Whether this sense of inclusiveness is as persuasive as the former sense of exclusiveness to arouse national consciousness is not yet clear. It can be argued that the former ideas of 'chosenness' and 'divine election' were more convincing than the current national idea of openness towards other territo-rial identities. Yet, following the line of argumentation of Ashworth and

Graham,[44] the attribution of features of a higher territorial level to a national representation may also reinforce the national consciousness at the expense of the European consciousness. This means that the national consciousness that results from the European attributes undermines a European consciousness. It is much too early to draw any conclusions about this from the sources I have used in this article. Yet, it is obvious that theoretically the national offering offers the political authorities of Spain a useful means to arouse national consciousness. By means of a shift from *exclusiveness* to *inclusiveness*, a way is found to reconcile post-Constitutional nationalist discourse with a centuries old religious tradition.

NOTES

1. R. D. Sack, *Human Territoriality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986) p. 19.

2. N. Brenner, 'Globalization as Reterritorialization: The Re-scaling of Urban Governance in the European Union', *Urban Studies* 36/3 (1999) pp. 431–451.

3. See for instance the Eurobarometer Survey 60 (2003), available at <http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/standard_en.htm>.

4. A. Paasi, 'Region and Place: Regional Identity in Question', *Progress in Human Geography* 27/(2003) pp. 476–478.

5. B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London/New York: Verso 1991).

6. J. Casanova, '2000 Presidential Address: Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization', *Sociology of Religion* 62/4 (2001) p. 431.

7. E. Kedourie, *Nationalism* (Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell 1993).

8. J. Casanova (note 6) pp. 431–433.

9. A. D. Smith, 'Ethnic Election and National Destiny: Some Religious Origins of Nationalist Ideals', *Nations and Nationalism* 5/3 (1999) pp. 331–355.

10. A. D. Smith, 'The 'Sacred' Dimension of Nationalism', *Millenium: Journal of International Studies* 29/3 (2000) pp. 791–814.

11. G. H. Herb and D. H. Kaplan (eds), *Nested Identities* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 1999).

12. G. J. Ashworth and B. Graham, 'Heritage, Identity and Europe', *Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie* 88/4 (1997) pp. 381–388.

13. The texts of the invocations and responses of the national offering between 1949 and 2001 are published by C. Presas Barrosa, *Las Ofrendas Nacionales a Santiago Apóstol, Patrón de España* (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia 2001). The invocation and response of 2004 can be found on the official website of the royal family (<http://www.casareal.es/casareal/>) and on the website of the archbishopric of Compostela (<http://www.archicompostela.org/>).

14. See for instance R. A. Fletcher, *Saint James catapult: The Life and Times of Diego Gelmírez of Santiago de Compostela* (Oxford: Calrendon Press 1984) or another of the many books published on the medieval pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela.

15. Alfonso II (circa 866–911) stated, for instance, that Saint James protected his kingdom from rebels and invaders.

16. Saint James became known as defender of Christianity as a result of his presumed 'divine' assistance in reconquering the Iberian Peninsula from the Arabs during the Reconquista.

17. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 19.

18. Ibid., pp. 28–30.

19. J. M. Palomares Ibañez, 'La Política Española y Su Reflejo en las Ofrendas al Apostel Santiago, 1898–1939', *Cuadernos de Estudios Gallegos* 32 (1981) pp. 217–264.

20. J. Álvarez Junco, 'The Formation of Spanish Identity and Its Adaptation to the Age of Nations', *History and Memory: Studies in Representations of the Past* 14 (2002) p. 25.

21. A. Olivera and C. de Busser, 'Spain: Challenging centuries of Roman Catholic Dominance', in H. Knippenberg (ed.), *The Changing Religious Landscape of Europe* (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis 2005) pp. 75–87.

22. The author is currently working on a Ph.D. thesis on the politico-territorial meaning of three shrines, including Santiago de Compostela. In this thesis, more sources are analysed, such as the results of a quantitative survey of visitors to the shrines.

23. C. G. Reigosa Reigosa, 'El Camino de Santiago: ¿Hacia una Nueva Identidad?', in L. Blanco Vila (ed.), *El Camino de Santiago* (Madrid: Editorial Complutense 1995) pp. 37–42.

24. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 157.

25. A. D. Smith (note 10) p. 799.

26. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 128.

27. Presas Barrosa (note 13) pp. 125–126.

28. Casanova (note 6) p. 433; J. Anderson, 'Catholicism and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Poland', *West-European Politics* 26/1 (2003).

29. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 202.

30. A. Whitehead, 'Spain, European Regions and City States', in C. Mar-Molinero and A. Smith (eds), *Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula: Competing and Conflicting Identities* (Oxford: Berg 1996) p. 256.

31. J. P. Fusi Aizpúrua, 'España: La Evolución de la Identidad Nacional' (Madrid: Temas de Hoy 2000) pp. 262–266.

32. X. M. Núñez, 'What is Spanish Nationalism Today? From Legitimacy crisis to unfulfilled renovation (1975–2000)', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24/5 (2001) pp. 719–752.

33. Núñez (note 32).

34. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 352.

35. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 341.

36. Gaspar does, however, state that there is a correspondence between the European oriented character of Galician nationalism in the early part of the twentieth century and the 'spirit of Compostela'. S. Gaspar, *A Xeración Nós eo Camiño de Santiago* (Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, publication year unknown).

37. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 415.

38. Official website of the royal family (note 13).

39. Interview with F. Singul (9 September 2004), member of the cultural department of Xacobeo. The Galician interest in the cult of Saint James has also been addressed in B. Graham and M. Murray, *'The Spiritual and the Profane: the Pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela'*; *Ecumene* 4/4 (1997) pp. 389–409.

40. See, for instance, the website of Xacobeo (<http://www.xacobeo.es>) or the website of UNESCO (<http://whc.unesco.org>).

41. This point has also been addressed in B. Graham and M. Murray (note 39).

42. Núñez (note 32) p. 726.

43. Presas Barrosa (note 13) p. 536.

44. Ashworth and Graham (note 12) p. 382.